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Game Theory for Applied Economists.

by Gibbons, Robert.
Material type: materialTypeLabelBookDescription: 1 online resource (284 pages).ISBN: 9781282936423.Subject(s): Electronic booksOnline resources: Click to View
Contents:
Cover -- Contents -- 1 Static Games of Complete Information -- 1.1 Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium -- 1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games -- 1.1.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies -- 1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium -- 1.2 Applications -- 1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly -- 1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly -- 1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration -- 1.2.D The Problem of the Commons -- 1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium -- 1.3.A Mixed Strategies -- 1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium -- 1.4 Further Reading -- 1.5 Problems -- 1.6 References -- 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information -- 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information -- 2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction -- 2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly -- 2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm -- 2.1.D Sequential Bargaining -- 2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information -- 2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection -- 2.2.B Bank Runs -- 2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition -- 2.2.D Tournaments -- 2.3 Repeated Games -- 2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games -- 2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games -- 2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists -- 2.3.D Efficiency Wages -- 2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy -- 2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information -- 2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games -- 2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- 2.5 Further Reading -- 2.6 Problems -- 2.7 References -- 3 Static Games of Incomplete Information -- 3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- 3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information -- 3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games -- 3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- 3.2 Applications -- 3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited -- 3.2.B An Auction.
3.2.C A Double Auction -- 3.3 The Revelation Principle -- 3.4 Further Reading -- 3.5 Problems -- 3.6 References -- 4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information -- 4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.2 Signaling Games -- 4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games -- 4.2.B Job-Market Signaling -- 4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure -- 4.2.D Monetary Policy -- 4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games -- 4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information -- 4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma -- 4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.5 Further Reading -- 4.6 Problems -- 4.7 References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.
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Cover -- Contents -- 1 Static Games of Complete Information -- 1.1 Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium -- 1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games -- 1.1.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies -- 1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium -- 1.2 Applications -- 1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly -- 1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly -- 1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration -- 1.2.D The Problem of the Commons -- 1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium -- 1.3.A Mixed Strategies -- 1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium -- 1.4 Further Reading -- 1.5 Problems -- 1.6 References -- 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information -- 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information -- 2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction -- 2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly -- 2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm -- 2.1.D Sequential Bargaining -- 2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information -- 2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection -- 2.2.B Bank Runs -- 2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition -- 2.2.D Tournaments -- 2.3 Repeated Games -- 2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games -- 2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games -- 2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists -- 2.3.D Efficiency Wages -- 2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy -- 2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information -- 2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games -- 2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- 2.5 Further Reading -- 2.6 Problems -- 2.7 References -- 3 Static Games of Incomplete Information -- 3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- 3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information -- 3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games -- 3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- 3.2 Applications -- 3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited -- 3.2.B An Auction.

3.2.C A Double Auction -- 3.3 The Revelation Principle -- 3.4 Further Reading -- 3.5 Problems -- 3.6 References -- 4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information -- 4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.2 Signaling Games -- 4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games -- 4.2.B Job-Market Signaling -- 4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure -- 4.2.D Monetary Policy -- 4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games -- 4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information -- 4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma -- 4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.5 Further Reading -- 4.6 Problems -- 4.7 References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

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Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.

Hong Kong Nang Yan College of Higher Education
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