This paper examines the reasons behind the continual growth of the phenomenon of famers ‘planting’ cheap and substandard houses on farmland in rural China repeatedly and without government permission. The practice has been commonly interpreted by local governments as schemes instigated by greedy farmers to maximise compensation payments from the government when their properties are requisitioned for public infrastructural or private development projects. Researchers however have found that such practices are measures farmers learnt from others to insure themselves against land grabs as well as inadequate compensation offered by local governments and developers. Their vulnerability however also spanned a growing illegal industry where farmers short of cash were lured into participating in organised ‘house planting’ projects although they could be caught and put in jail by local authorities. Other researchers are equally concerned by the threat of food security should these incidences continue to escalate. However, these problems would not be easily addressed because the survival of local governments has grown to be heavily dependent on both the huge revenues generated by and winning political mileage from urbanising the rural, or converting agricultural to non-agricultural lands.

本文探討中國農民不斷違規在近郊農地「種植」廉價和不合格房屋的現像。地方政府普遍解讀這種做法為農民密謀增加征地作公共基建或私人發展項目時補償額的貪婪行為。研究人員則發現，農民實際是互相學習保障自己免受地方政府或發展商強行征地和補償不足。可是，弱勢的農民同時牽涉持續增長的非法行業，因為缺乏現金的農民會受誘騙參與有組織的「種房」項目，即使地方當局可能因而將他們逮捕和收監。其他研究人員關注到，如果這些事件不斷升級，將會威脅糧食安全。但是，地方政府的生存嚴重依賴征地發展所產生的巨大收入，和農村城市化或將農地轉變為非農用地的政治本錢，都令這些問題不能輕易解決。

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