Game Theory for Applied Economists. (Record no. 36461)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 04215nam a22003853i 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field EBC4968572
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field MiAaPQ
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20191009123142.0
006 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--ADDITIONAL MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS--GENERAL INFORMATION
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007 - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION FIXED FIELD--GENERAL INFORMATION
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008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 191009s2010 xx o ||||0 eng d
020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER
International Standard Book Number 9781282936423
-- (electronic bk.)
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (MiAaPQ)EBC4968572
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (Au-PeEL)EBL4968572
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (CaONFJC)MIL293642
035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER
System control number (OCoLC)741250611
040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE
Original cataloging agency MiAaPQ
Language of cataloging eng
Description conventions rda
-- pn
Transcribing agency MiAaPQ
Modifying agency MiAaPQ
082 0# - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER
Classification number 330.015193
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name Gibbons, Robert.
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title Game Theory for Applied Economists.
264 #1 - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Place of publication, distribution, etc Princeton :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc Princeton University Press,
Date of publication, distribution, etc 2010.
264 #4 - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT)
Date of publication, distribution, etc �2010.
300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION
Extent 1 online resource (284 pages)
336 ## - CONTENT TYPE
Content type term text
Content type code txt
Source rdacontent
337 ## - MEDIA TYPE
Media type term computer
Media type code c
Source rdamedia
338 ## - CARRIER TYPE
Carrier type term online resource
Carrier type code cr
Source rdacarrier
505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note Cover -- Contents -- 1 Static Games of Complete Information -- 1.1 Basic Theory: Normal-Form Games and Nash Equilibrium -- 1.1.A Normal-Form Representation of Games -- 1.1.B Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies -- 1.1.C Motivation and Definition of Nash Equilibrium -- 1.2 Applications -- 1.2.A Cournot Model of Duopoly -- 1.2.B Bertrand Model of Duopoly -- 1.2.C Final-Offer Arbitration -- 1.2.D The Problem of the Commons -- 1.3 Advanced Theory: Mixed Strategies and Existence of Equilibrium -- 1.3.A Mixed Strategies -- 1.3.B Existence of Nash Equilibrium -- 1.4 Further Reading -- 1.5 Problems -- 1.6 References -- 2 Dynamic Games of Complete Information -- 2.1 Dynamic Games of Complete and Perfect Information -- 2.1.A Theory: Backwards Induction -- 2.1.B Stackelberg Model of Duopoly -- 2.1.C Wages and Employment in a Unionized Firm -- 2.1.D Sequential Bargaining -- 2.2 Two-Stage Games of Complete but Imperfect Information -- 2.2.A Theory: Subgame Perfection -- 2.2.B Bank Runs -- 2.2.C Tariffs and Imperfect International Competition -- 2.2.D Tournaments -- 2.3 Repeated Games -- 2.3.A Theory: Two-Stage Repeated Games -- 2.3.B Theory: Infinitely Repeated Games -- 2.3.C Collusion between Cournot Duopolists -- 2.3.D Efficiency Wages -- 2.3.E Time-Consistent Monetary Policy -- 2.4 Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information -- 2.4.A Extensive-Form Representation of Games -- 2.4.B Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- 2.5 Further Reading -- 2.6 Problems -- 2.7 References -- 3 Static Games of Incomplete Information -- 3.1 Theory: Static Bayesian Games and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- 3.1.A An Example: Cournot Competition under Asymmetric Information -- 3.1.B Normal-Form Representation of Static Bayesian Games -- 3.1.C Definition of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- 3.2 Applications -- 3.2.A Mixed Strategies Revisited -- 3.2.B An Auction.
505 8# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE
Formatted contents note 3.2.C A Double Auction -- 3.3 The Revelation Principle -- 3.4 Further Reading -- 3.5 Problems -- 3.6 References -- 4 Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information -- 4.1 Introduction to Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.2 Signaling Games -- 4.2.A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games -- 4.2.B Job-Market Signaling -- 4.2.C Corporate Investment and Capital Structure -- 4.2.D Monetary Policy -- 4.3 Other Applications of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.3.A Cheap-Talk Games -- 4.3.B Sequential Bargaining under Asymmetric Information -- 4.3.C Reputation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma -- 4.4 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium -- 4.5 Further Reading -- 4.6 Problems -- 4.7 References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.
588 ## - SOURCE OF DESCRIPTION NOTE
Source of description note Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2019. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
655 #4 - INDEX TERM--GENRE/FORM
Genre/form data or focus term Electronic books.
776 08 - ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL FORM ENTRY
Display text Print version:
Main entry heading Gibbons, Robert
Title Game Theory for Applied Economists
Place, publisher, and date of publication Princeton : Princeton University Press,c2010
797 2# - LOCAL ADDED ENTRY--CORPORATE NAME (RLIN)
Corporate name or jurisdiction name as entry element ProQuest (Firm)
856 40 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS
Uniform Resource Identifier http://ezproxy01.ny.edu.hk:2048/login?url=https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ircp3g4/detail.action?docID=4968572
Public note Click to View

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